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Prior Art in Inter Partes Review
Stephen Yelderman*
ABSTRACT: This Essay is an empirical study of the evidence the Patent Trial
and Appeal Board relies upon when cancelling patents in inter partes review.
To construct our dataset, we collected every final written decision
invalidating a patent claim over a twelve-month period. We coded individual
invalidation events on a reference-by-reference, claim-by-claim basis. Drawing
on this dataset, we report a number of details about the prior art supporting
patent cancellation, including the frequency with which U.S. patents, foreign
patents, and printed publications were cited, the frequency with which the
invalidating prior art would have been amenable to a pre-filing prior art
search, and whether the invalidating prior art was known at the time of
examination.
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In 201 1, Congress created a new procedural tool-inter partes review
("IPR")-for the express purpose of making it cheaper and easier to contest
the validity of issued patents in an adversarial proceeding.' The first IPR
petitions were accepted in 2o2, and the first Final Written Decisions
("FWDs") issued in late 2013.3
In terms of cost and ease of access, IPR has undoubtedly been a success.
Several years after IPR's launch, practitioners reported that the cost of
litigating an IPR to a final written decision was about $324,000, which pales
in comparison to the $1-2 million reported cost of litigating a patent in
court.4 The volume of patent invalidations has expanded as well. Whereas
district courts previously invalidated about 8o patents a year on prior art
groundss the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB") now invalidates about
280 patents a year through IPR.6 Largely due to this new procedure, the
number of patents invalidated based on prior art increased by at least 400%
between 2011 and 2017.7
But these numbers hint at a counterintuitive counterpoint: that the
introduction of IPR may have actually increased the total number of dollars
spent adjudicating patents annually. While individual invalidity events are
cheaper in IPR than in district court, the sheer volume of IPR activity could
more than offset these lower unit costs. And though confounding factors
1. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 299 (2011)
("AIA") (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-319 (2012)); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct.
2131, 2144 (2o16) (discussing the purposes of the AIA amendments);Joe Matal, A Guide to the
Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of H, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 600-04 (2012)
(summarizing the legislative history of the AIA).
2. See Garmin Int'l Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. IPR 2012-00001 (P.T.A.B. Sept.
16, 2012) (Petition for Inter Partes Review Under 37 C.F.R. § 42.100), available at https://
ptabdata.uspto.gov/ptab-api/documents/395242/native (last visitedJune 8, 2019).
3. See Garmin Int'l Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. IPR 201 2-00001 (P.T.A.B. Nov.
13, 2013) (Final Written Decision-35 U.S.C. § 318(a) and 37 § C.F.R. 42-73), available at
https://ptabdata.uspto.gov/ptab-api/documents/340330/native (last visitedJune 8, 2019).
4. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAw Ass'N, 2017 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 1-162,
1-115 (2017) [hereinafter, AIPIA SURVEY]. Note that the reported expense of litigated a patent
in district court changes dramatically depending on the amount at issue in a case. The numbers
above are reported medians for mid-range cases, with stakes in the $io million to $25 million range.
5. See Stephen Yelderman, Prior Art in the District Court, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 5) (currently on file at Notre Dame Law Sch. Legal Studies
Research, Paper No. 1858, 2018), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=3286022.
6. See infra text accompanying note 53 (observing 283 distinct patents invalidated over a
12-month period).
7. In 2016 and the first half of 2017, district courts were on pace to invalidate about 40
distinct patents per year on grounds of prior art. SeeYelderman, supra note 5. Combined with about
280 distinct patents invalidated per year in IPR, about 320 patents are invalidated per year in one
forum or the other-compared with about 8o per year in district court in the early 201os. The
increase is at least 400%, because these numbers do not include invalidation in post-grant review.
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complicate the story, there is no evidence that the new procedures have
reduced the rate of district court litigation. Whether compared in terms of
number of patent cases filed or patents invalidated, the work of district courts
actually increased from 2oi to 2017.8 In sum, the new IPR procedures have
dramatically increased the number of patents subjected to adversarial
scrutiny. But all this additional process has come at a significant cost-easily
exceeding half a billion dollars a year.9
Whether this additional process is worth its costs depends on the public
benefits afforded by IPR. And there are many ways that increased scrutiny of
patents could plausibly benefit the public. For example, in some cases,
cancelling a patent in IPR may increase competition in a product market,
resulting in lower prices for consumers.o As another example, a second-stage
review process like IPR could help the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
8. According to data from Lex Machina, 3,596 patent suits were filed in district courts in
2011; in 2017, the number was 4,043. According to data we collected for a prior project, courts
invalidated i09 unique patents in 2011; they were on track to invalidate 254 unique patents in
2017. SeeYelderman, supra note 5, at 43. To be fair, the 2017 invalidations may be less costly per
patent, as the grounds relied upon in district court changed significantly between 2o 1 to 2017.
See id. But, on the other hand, it is possible that parties are incurring costs in district court while
IPR cases are pending, only to have those cases end once PTAB finds the patent invalid. All of
this makes it unclear whether the total cost of district court litigation went up or down since the
advent of IPR.
g. This rough estimate is based on Lex Machina data regarding the disposal of IPR
petitions filed in calendar year 2016. In that year, 761 of IPR petitions filed were either denied
or settled prior to an institution decision. AIPLA data suggests the median cost of attorneys' fees
for filing a petition is $124,ooo, so these cases costed about $94 million altogether. See AIPLA
SURVEY, supra note 4, at 1-164. (This number is likely low, since some of the patent owners in
these cases would have incurred costs responding to the petition.) An additional 158 petitions
were granted but resulted in IPRs that settled prior to a final institution. The attorneys' fees for
these petitions would vary based on the timing of the settlement, so we conservatively estimate
that each side incurred costs equal to the cost of filing a petition, or $248,ooo per case in this
category, for a total of $39 million. The remaining 515 petitions resulted in final written
decisions, which AIPIA data suggests would involve attorneys' fees of about $648,000 per case,
for a total of $334 million. See id. Approximately 146 of the cases in this final category were
appealed to the Federal Circuit SeeJason Rantanen, Administering Patent Law, 104 IOWA L. REV.
2299, 2311 (2019). AIPLA data suggests a Federal Circuit appeal adds $254,000 to the total costs
of an IPR, for an additional $37 million. Thus, total attorneys' fees related to IPR would come to
at least $504 million. To this estimate, one must add the PTAB's cost of administering the IPR
program-accepting filings, ruling on petitions, holding trials, and issuing final written decisions.
These costs are difficult to estimate. For reference, however, in its Fiscal Year 2og Budget
Request, the USPTO justified $86 million of its total budget request based on the PTAB's
operations. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2019 CONGRESSIONAL
JUSTIFICATION 36 (2018), http://www.osec.doc.gov/bmi/budget/FYigCBJ/USPTOFYi9-
President%E2 %80%99s_Budget-FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2019). Though the PTAB hears
other kinds of proceedings as well, IPRs have constituted the vast majority of the PTAB's
published work in recent years.
10. See generally Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 83 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1943 (2016) (analyzing the pro-competitive effects of patent challenges).
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("PTO") ensure that it is consistently applying patentability rules across a
complex bureaucracy.II
This Essay focuses on one potential public benefit in particular-that
revoking invalid patents can increase inventors' incentives to create
legitimately patentable inventions in the future. As the theory goes, the power
of the patent bargain depends both on the likelihood that inventors will
receive patent rights when they deserve them and the likelihood that inventors
will not receive patent rights when they do not deserve them.12 By subjecting
patents to additional adversarial scrutiny, IPR has the potential to enforce the
patent bargain in doubtful cases, thereby strengthening incentives to comply
with the substantive demands of patent law in the future.
However, the availability of this particular benefit depends on the reason
that a particular patent is revoked. Some patent doctrines are designed to be
bargain-enforcing, while others are not.'3 In the case of the two doctrines at
issue in IPR-anticipation and obviousness-whether or not a revocation is
bargain-enforcing depends on the prior art at issue.'4 In some cases, it may
be-such as when the inventor knew or should have known about the prior
art that rendered her patent invalid. But in other cases, revoking patents in
IPR may not be bargain-enforcing at all-such as when the inventor loses her
patent on the basis of facts she simply could not have known. In short, without
knowing something about the prior art underlying those determinations, we
cannot say whether IPR is increasing incentives for future inventors to do what
patent law demands of them, or is simply revoking patents from inventors
whose only fault was a stroke of bad luck.
This Essay provides an early look at the prior art used to invalidate patents
in IPR. Drawing on public records, we reviewed every FWD issued in an IPR
by the PTAB between March 2017 and February 2018. In these documents,
we observed 6,976 claim-level invalidity events affecting 283 distinct patents.
We then coded the prior art reference(s) relied upon in each of those
invalidation events, observing a total of 822 distinct prior art references.
This data reveals that the incentivizing power of IPR compares poorly
with that of district court litigation. A common weakness of both tools is a
reliance on prior U.S. patent applications that the inventor could not possibly
have known about, because a federal statute made them secret at the time she
filed her application. This category of art is even more common in IPR than
it is in district court. Moreover, IPRs frequently rely on another category of
obscure prior art that is refreshingly rare in district court opinions:
11. See generaUy Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Patent Trial and Appeal Board's
Consistency-Enhancing Function, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2417 (2019).
12. Stephen Yelderman, The Value of Accuracy in the Patent System 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1217,
1248 (2017).
13. See id. at 1283.
14. See id. at 1277.
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"publications" that meet the legal definition of prior art, but that would not
be discovered in a traditional prior art search. A substantial number of IPR
invalidations can be characterized as cases in which a person with ordinary
skill in the art would have found it obvious to combine something she likely
would not have found with something she was legally prohibited from finding.
The bargain-enforcement theory appears to be weakly realized in practice.
To be sure, enforcing the patent bargain to create incentives for future
inventors is only one potential benefit offered by IPR. Further study will be
necessary to fully understand the costs and benefits of this newly created
procedure. Nonetheless, there is value in exploring this particular theory of
benefit in detail, for two reasons. First, formal study of IPR is in its infancy,
and there is presently no single theory of benefit that has been shown to justify
the procedural costs of IPR in all cases.'s If, as seems likely, the balance of the
costs and benefits of IPR depends on the specifics of how IPR operates in
practice, then it is important to understand when and how IPR delivers its
theorized benefits. Second, even if the overall benefits of IPR as a procedural
tool exceed its overall cost, there may be additional gains to be had by
directing this tool to the individual cases in which the greatest benefits are
available. Unlike litigation, which may generally be invoked as of right by
anyone with a qualifying dispute, IPR is a discretionary proceeding before an
administrative agency.'6 The PTO therefore has the opportunity to steer
public and private resources to those disputes which might yield the greatest
public benefits.
Because this project is only a first step towards specifying the public
benefits of IPR, its conclusions will necessarily be preliminary. We cannot
(and do not) say whether IPR is on net helpful or harmful, or even whether
the PTO ought to employ its discretion differently. Instead, our focus is
limited to whether the IPRs decided during our study period delivered just
one of several potential benefits. While the answer to that question turns out
to be discouraging, this should not be misunderstood as a conclusive
judgement about IPR.
II. BACKGROUND
Before turning to the methodology of this study, it will be helpful to
briefly explain why the error-correction value of IPR turns on the prior art at
issue in a case. Moreover, it is important to distinguish this theory of benefit
15. For example, while the pro-competitive benefits of cancelling a patent can be
substantial, IPR may not be equipped to reliably deliver these benefits in all cases. SeeYelderman,
supra note 1o, at 1960, 1997-2004.
16. See35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLCv. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 213 1, 21 40 (2016)
("[T]he agency's decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office's discretion.").
2o01g] 27og
IOWA LAW REVIEW
from others that might obtain, but that simply depend on a different set of
considerations. '7
Courts and scholars have long heralded the public benefits of patent
litigation. For nearly a century, the public's "paramount interest" in ensuring
that patents are "free from fraud" and "kept within their legitimate scope" has
been stated as a self-evident proposition requiring neither proof nor
elaboration.'8 Today, courts, commentators, and litigants often cite the public
benefits of patent litigation as if they are an accepted fact.'9
Upon closer examination, there are at least two analytically distinct ways
that patent cases may serve the public interest. The first theory is that revoking
a patent can reduce or eliminate market power, thereby increasing
competition and freeing the public from the burden of a "patent
monopoly."20 The second theory is that revoking a patent denies the patent
holder the benefit of something she did not deserve, thus sharpening
incentives for inventors to comply with the substantive demands of patent
law.21 The first theory is about reducing the costs of individual patents; the
second is about enforcing the patent bargain to improve ex ante incentives.
The first theory is important, but it is not the subject of this paper. As I
have shown in earlier work, the possibility that a patent challenge may
increase competition is highly case-specific, depending on factors such as who
17. For a similar exploration of the potential benefits that might flow from district court
patent litigation, see Yelderman, supra note 5, at Section I.A.
18. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 8o6, 816 (1945);
see also Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892) ("It is as important to the public
that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really
valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly."); Yelderman, supra note io, at 1951-58
(collecting similar claims).
19. See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365,
1374 (2018) ("[T]he public's paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies are kept
within their legitimate scope." (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2144)); SAS Inst., Inc. v.
Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1363 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same); see also FTC, To PROMOTE
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 11 (Oct
2003), available at http://perma.cc/D4 DC-WGC7; Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in
Patent Challenges, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 498, 538-39 (2o15); Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger,
Solving the Patent Settlement Puzzle, 91 TEX. L. REV. 283, 293-95 (2012); Joseph Farrell & Robert
P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office
Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 943, 946 (2004);
Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the Market and How Should We
Change?-The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 76-77, 90-92 (2oo6);
Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101,
127, 179 (2006); Anup Malani &Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO.
L.J. 637, 657 (2013); Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Diferential Impact, 8 MINN.
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 9-11 (2007); R Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157
U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2140-45 (2009); Robert C. Dorr, Note, Patent Lawu-Patent Validity: The Public
Is the Third Party, 51 DENV. L.J. 95, 113 (1974).
20. SeeYelderman, supra note lo, at 1951-54 (summarizing this theory).
21. SeeYelderman, supra note 12, at 1221 n.13, 1281-84.
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wins, how quickly the case is resolved, whether there are other intellectual
property rights at play, and other details about the patent-in-suit and the
structure of the relevant market.22 Because the prior art used to invalidate a
patent is not usually relevant to the competition question, this theory will be
largely set aside for purposes of the following discussion, keeping in mind that
it may justify the costs of IPRs in some cases in which the second theory does
not.
The other reason we might want to encourage patent challenges is that
revoking undeserved patents can sharpen incentives for future inventors
-and this theory is the subject of this Essay. As my prior work explores in
detail, the incentivizing power of any promise depends both on the accurate
reward of benefits when they are deserved and on the accurate denial of those
benefits when they are undeserved.23 Revoking an undeserved patent fulfills
the negative promise implicit in the rewards scheme, thus increasing the
power of the offered rewards in the future.24 In this way, successful patent
challenges serve the public interest by denying the benefits of patents to those
who did not hold up their end of the patent bargain.
Like the first, this theory is case-specific. Some patent disputes center on
conduct that the patent system actively seeks to encourage or discourage
-such as a claim that the supposed "inventor" had in fact stolen the invention
from someone else.25 But other patent cases aren't like that. Instead, they are
really just fights over technicalities that do not strongly implicate the patent
bargain-such as pinning down exactly how difficult it would have been for a
hypothetical researcher to find a particular undergraduate thesis on the shelf
of a university library.26 When an inventor fails to satisfy the patentability
requirements in a case like that, revoking the patent does not sharpen
incentives to behave differently in the future: The inventor has done
everything patent law demanded of her, yet she is denied patent protection
all the same. This second theory of benefit justifies patent litigation only in
cases in which the inventor faced a mutually exclusive choice and made a
decision contrary to the aims of patent law.27
The power of this incentives-based theory is that it can significantly
reduce the range of plausibly optimal error rates in the patent system. With
some basic assumptions about the observability of errors, the incentives-based
theory can show that patents should be awarded only when there is at least a
50% chance that they are actually deserved.28 This, in turn, provides qualified
22. SeeYelderman, supra note io, at 1960-61.
23. SeeYelderrman, supra note 12, at 1221.
24. Id. at 124 7- 4 8.
25. See id. at 1266.
26. SeeIn reCronyn, 89o F.2d 1158, 1 16o-61 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
27. SeeYelderman, supra note 12, at 1242-43.
28. See id. at 1251-56.
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support for longstanding policies designed to increase rates of patent
adjudication.29 But there is a limit. When a patent is revoked for reasons
beyond the inventor's control, the inventor faced no relevant mutually
exclusive choice, and the inventor-incentivizing benefit is unavailable. In
those cases, revoking an invalid patent may actually be disincentivizing, since it
reduces the correlation between conduct and outcome, thereby weakening
the power of the patent promise. This does not mean these cases necessarily
lack value; they may still be justified on some other grounds. But as far as the
inventor-incentivizing theory goes, the benefits of revocation are limited to
cases in which inventors lose patent rights as a result of things they could have
plausibly controlled.3o
Litigation involving some patentability doctrines will reliably satisfy this
condition. For example, the enablement requirement is specifically designed
to coerce patent applicants to teach the public how to use the invention.3'
When an applicant fails to sufficiently disclose an invention and her patent is
consequentially taken away, the fault is entirely her own. No extrinsic factors
or moral luck intercedes between the conduct patent law seeks to influence
and the outcome patent law provides. Provided they are observable, these are
reliably inventor-incentivizing error corrections.
For the two patentability doctrines that can be invoked in IPR
(anticipation and obviousness), however, the path from conduct to outcome
is more roundabout. When a patent is revoked on these grounds, the
inventor's culpability in having originally sought that patent turns
significantly on the nature of the prior art itself.
To see why, consider the anticipation doctrine (sometimes called the
"novelty" requirement) 32 A patent claim is anticipated only when all of the
elements of the claim can be found in a single prior art reference. Critically,
a factfinder may not combine multiple references to establish anticipation.s3
For that reason, the anticipation inquiry is quite straightforward. The
factfinder simply compares the prior art to the patent claim to see if there is
a match.34
29. See id. at 1281-83.
30. Cf Louis Kaplow, The Value ofAccuracy in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23J. LEGAL
STUD. 307, 313-14, 332 (1994) (observing that greater accuracy in adjudication can be a waste
of resources if actors lack the same information at the moment of their decision-making).
31. SeeYelderman, supra note 12, at 1263-65.
32. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2oo6) (amended 2011). Note that § 102 was reorganized and
substantively changed in several ways by the AIA. Unless otherwise noted, references to § 102
refer to the pre-AIA version of the statute, which was the applicable law for 99% of the
invalidations in our dataset.
33. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., igo F-3 d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
34. To be sure, and in ways that are not relevant here, this seemingly simple comparison
can become more complicated. For example, the court may need to first determine what the
challenged claim means, whether the asserted prior art reference has any undisclosed but
[VOI. 104:27052712
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The value of commissioning that comparison depends greatly on what,
exactly, we are asking the factfinder to compare the claim to. For example, a
patent can be anticipated because the inventor published her idea long
before patenting, sat on the sideline for years, and then sought patent
protection only after the idea caught on. This behavior creates serious hold-
up problems for the public and is something patent law very much seeks to
discourage.ss Catching such cases, therefore, is a strongly incentivizing form
of error correction. In addition, even in cases where the inventor didn't
actually know about the prior art at the time, denying patent protection based
on reasonably discoverable prior art encourages future inventors to seek out
existing solutions before wastefully reinventing the wheel.36 So when the
inventor could have discovered the anticipating prior art with a reasonable
amount of searching, revoking her patent is a strongly incentivizing form of
error correction.
But anticipation can also rely on obscure prior art, things which the
inventor didn't know about and couldn't possibly have found-such as an
unpublished illustration discoverable only by travelling in person to the
Canadian patent office.37 Invalidations like these are not an incentivizing form
of error correction: The inventor cannot seriously be blamed for failing to
travel to every patent office in the world. The inventor is perhaps unlucky, but
has done nothing that patent law affirmatively seeks to discourage.38 In cases
of anticipation, the difference between valuable enforcement of the patent
bargain and an infringer escaping on a technicality is entirely a question of
the prior art.
The other way prior art can invalidate a claim is through the obviousness
doctrine. Even in cases in which the claimed invention is not anticipated, a
patent may be invalid "if the differences between the claimed invention and
the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been
obvious."s9 As the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he nonobviousness
requirement extends the field of unpatentable material beyond that which is
[anticipated], to include that which could readily be deduced from publicly
available material by a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent field of
endeavor."4o Thus even if the claimed invention cannot be found in any single
"inherent" features, and whether the asserted prior art reference is enabled. See id. at 1346-47
(discussing claim construction and inherency); see also Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.,
413 F-3d 1318, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
35. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1998).
36. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES &JoHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY CASES
ANDMATERIALS401-02 (6th ed. 2013); Yelderman, supra note 12, at 1267.
37. See Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 453 F-3d 1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(NewmanJ., dissenting from denial of petition to rehear en banc).
38. SeeYelderman, supra note 12, at 1272-76.
39. See35U.S.C.§ 103 (2012 &Supp. 2017).
40. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989).
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prior art reference, the claim may still be invalid because it would have been
obvious in light of all the prior art that existed at the time of the invention.4'
As with cases of anticipation, the incentivizing effects of enforcing the
obviousness doctrine depend greatly on the prior art behind the legal
conclusion. In some cases, obviousness may be a tool for handling near-miss
cases of anticipation, causing the value of enforcing both doctrines to closely
track each other. For example, filing a patent claim on a trivial derivative of
something that has long been in the public domain should be discouraged
for the same reason that filing a claim on exactly what has long been in the
public domain should be discouraged-the inventor should have known that
the invention was already available to the public, and not wasted everyone's
time by seeking patent protection for it.42 Likewise, seeking subsequent
protection for simplistic variants of one's own prior inventions (also known as
"patent evergreening") is a wasteful, unproductive activity that patent law
seeks to discourage.43
But obviousness also extends to combinations of things that fall well
beyond widespread knowledge or the inventor's own prior work. All of the
obscure or secret references that qualify as prior art for purposes of
anticipation qualify as prior art for purposes of obviousness too.44 And the risk
of low-value error correction is even greater when an obscure reference is the
basis for obviousness. For example, if there is little incentivizing benefit in
revoking a patent because of an unpublished piece of paper sitting in
Canada,45 the benefit is even smaller when it comes to revoking a patent
because that Canadian document could have been combined with some other
information found in a different (and perhaps equally obscure) location. As
others have critically observed, the obviousness doctrine's "person of ordinary
skill" comes programmed with a superhuman amount of knowledge, which
can result in an unrealistic standard of invention when obscure prior art is at
issue.46 Thus, as with anticipation, the incentivizing power of revoking obvious
patents depends on the prior art supporting that conclusion.
To be clear, the fact that expansive prior art rules sometimes cause
inventors to lose patents for reasons beyond their control does not mean the
41. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). Under the ALA,
the question is whether it would have been obvious at the time of filing, not invention. See 35
U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
42. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Anticipation and Obviousness as Possession, 65 EMORY L.J.
987, 1027-29 (2016).
43. See Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug Modifications, and
theFDA, 1o4 IowAL.REv. 1129, 1154-55 (2019).
44. See Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252, 255-56 (1965).
45. See Bruckelmyer v. Ground Heaters, Inc., 453 F.3 d 1352, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2oo6).
46. SeeDaralynJ. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness ofInventions,
50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 1016-17 (2008); Michael Ebert, Superperson and the Prior Art, 67 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 657, 657-68 (1985).
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rules themselves are substantively flawed. As noted above, for purposes of this
discussion, we are exploring only one particular theory of how IPRs might
benefit the public-by sharpening inventor incentives to uphold the patent
bargain in the future. So even outcomes which are plainly not incentivizing
may nonetheless be justified on other grounds, such as preserving the public
domain or reducing the costs of patent protection.47
That said, the other potential benefits of IPR are also case-specific, so one
cannot assume that some other theory will always be there to justify IPR when
this one fails. Each theory will need to be explored individually to determine
whether IPR's benefits exceed its costs.
III. METHODOLOGY
To shed light on these questions, we examined a year's worth of FWDs in
which patent claims were invalidated in IPR. Section III.A describes our
methodology for collecting and coding these documents. Section III.B then
addresses several potential questions about reproducibility and selection
effects.
A. COLLECTION AND CODING
Collecting and analyzing invalidity in IPR involved three basic steps. First,
we collected the FWDs in which invalidity occurred. Second, we reviewed
these documents to determine the legal basis and prior art supporting the
PTAB decision. Third, we gathered contextualizing information about the
IPR, patent, and cited prior art from a number of secondary sources.
To obtain all relevant FWDs, we ran a search on Lex Machina for IPR
proceedings with a decision rendered between March 1, 2017, and February
28, 2018.41 We then filtered these results to exclude FWDs in which no claims
were found invalid. This yielded a list of 342 PTAB Trial Numbers
47. Indeed, some patentability doctrines may be justified out of concerns for ex post costs
alone. For example, the Supreme Court has rooted the patentable subject matter requirement
exclusively in concerns about costs; revocations on these grounds are not intended to discourage
future inventors from exploring abstract ideas or natural phenomenon. Yelderman, supra note
12, at 1270-72.
48. We chose these dates to ensure a recent, 12-month study period. We closed the study
period at the end of February 2018, to avoid capturing any short-term effects in the wake of SAS
Institute, Inc. v. Iancu. See generally SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) (holding, in




corresponding to IPRs in which one or more claims were found invalid.49 We
then downloaded the FWDs themselves directly from PTAB's data portal.5o
For each qualifying FWD, we coded the legal determinations of
anticipation and/or obviousness at a claim level, identifying the reference(s)
supporting the invalidity decision.s' Redundant rationales for claim invalidity
were coded as distinct invalidity events. For example, if the PTAB found the
same claim both anticipated and obvious, we recorded one observation for
the anticipation conclusion and another observation for the obviousness
conclusion. Likewise, if the PTAB found the same claim anticipated by two
distinct references, we recorded one observation for anticipation based on
the first reference and another observation for anticipation based on the
second reference. We recorded only conclusions that a claim was invalid;
there are no failed validity challenges in our dataset. Our coding was based
exclusively on the decisions of the initial PTAB merits panels; we did not
observe the outcomes of appeals or rehearings.52
In total, we observed 6,976 claim-level invalidity events, affecting 4,248
distinct claims and 283 distinct patents. These cancellations relied on 822
distinct prior art references. As required by the IPR statute, all of these
invalidations were based on either novelty or obviousness, and cited either
patents or printed publications.53
Every step of this coding process was a straightforward matter of data
entry. Unlike some district court patent opinions, the PTAB decisions we read
were models of clarity. Helpfully, many FWDs concisely summarized the legal
49. Our original Lex Machina search returned an additional 15 PTAB Trial Numbers,
which did not in fact correspond to a unique IPR in which a claim had been invalidated. These
were IPRs that had either been joined to another LPR proceeding, or which did not actually
invalidate any claims (i.e., they appear to have been erroneously coded by Lex Machina). We
therefore exclude them from the following discussion.
50. The PTO should be commended for making PTAB dockets and unsealed documents
freely available through a straightforward API. See Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) Bulk Data,
USPTO, https://ptabdataui.uspto.gov (last visitedJune 8, 2019).
51. Because IPR challenges are limited to anticipation or obviousness, we only observed
invalidity on these grounds. PTAB does sometimes apply other legal doctrines when considering
whether a proposed amended claim would be patentable. We coded only PTAB's conclusions
about previously issued claims, not proposed amendments.
52. As a result, it is likely that at least a few of the invalidations in our dataset were later
reversed. Conversely, there are likely some cases in which PTAB did not find a particular claim
invalid, but the Federal Circuit did so on appeal. These invalidations events would be absent from
our dataset. We chose to focus on the work of PTAB because: (a) doing so permits us to study
more recent invalidation events (appeals and rehearings can drag on for years) and (b) a PTAB
determination of invalidity is often a legally and economically significant event in its own right,
even if it is later reversed or modified on appeal. We cannot predict how our results would change
if we tracked outcomes over the complete IPR lifecycle. But given the high rate of affirmance of
PTAB decisions, we expect that any effect would be small. SeeJason Rantanen, AdministeringPatent
Law, 104 IOWAL. REV. 2299, 23o6 (2019).
53. See35 U.S.. § 31 1(b) (2012).
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basis and prior art relied on to invalidate each claim in a tidy table at the end
of the document. Moreover, the FWDs we reviewed consistently included
bibliographic information for all cited references near the beginning of the
document.
The final step of our coding process was to gather contextualizing
information about the invalidated patents and prior art references from a
number of secondary sources. For example, we consulted PTO databases to
collect a number of data points relating to filing date, prosecution history,
and priority claims.54 In a few instances, we also searched the online catalog
of Notre Dame's primary research library for additional information about
printed publications cited in IPR.
Though time-intensive, this methodology is highly reproducible. Our
choice to code invalidity events at the level of individual claims is an essential
feature in this regard. Because a single FWD may reach different conclusions
for different claims, or invalidate the same claim for multiple reasons, coding
at a higher level of granularity would have required subjective judgments
about which aspects of the FWD were the most significant.55 We avoided these
judgments by simply coding everything.
B. SELECTIONEFmECS
Finally, a quick word about selection effects. Our population of interest
is invalidation events in IPR, which we have observed directly from the
underlying PTAB documents. This dataset allows us to report a number of
things about how and why patents are invalidated in IPR proceedings. It does
not, however, permit us to make inferences about patent quality more
generally. Only a very small fraction of issued patents are ever the subject of
54. In particular, at various steps of this project we employed the PTO's Public PAIR
Research Dataset, the PTO's Assignment Database, and the PTO's Historical Patent Data Files.
See generally StuartJ.H. Graham et al., The USPTO Patent Examination Research Dataset: A Window on
the Process of Patent Examination (U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Working Paper No. 2015-4,
2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2702637 (describing these resources); Alan C. Marco et al.,
The USPTO Historical Patent Data Files: Two Centuries ofInnovation (U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
Working Paper No. 2015-1, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2616724 (same).
55. Cf John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity ofLitigated Patents,
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 232 n.87 (1998) (describing "difficult judgment[s]" in determining which
references were "primarily" relied upon by the courts).
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an IPR petition.56 The PTAB itself determines which petitions to institute.57
And a significant number of IPRs settle, either before or after the institution
decision.s5 These various gatekeeping decisions-to petition for IPR, to
institute, to settle-may affect the mix of prior art that ultimately appears in
FWDs.
To illustrate, suppose that a very small percentage of observed FWDs rely
on foreign patents. From this fact, it may be tempting to conclude that very
few of the millions of U.S. patents in circulation are invalid based on foreign
patents, and perhaps even to discourage the USPTO from searching foreign
patents.59 This inference, however, would be unsupported. It could be the case
that millions of U.S. patents are invalid as a result of foreign patents, but hat
litigants typically settle these cases before PTAB can reach a decision on the
merits. Or, conversely, it is possible that litigants never settle such cases
(perhaps because they are especially cheap to litigate). Observed IPR
outcomes could either understate or overstate the importance of a prior art
category in terms of patent qualify overall. Therefore, this data can only be
used to answer questions about why patents are invalidated in IPR, not why
patents might be invalid in general.6o
Note, however, that for purposes of assessing the public benefits of IPR,
these selection effects are a feature, not a bug. In fact, they are the point. If
litigants typically settle cases involving a particular kind of prior art, that
tendency directly affects the value of the cases that are litigated to a decision,
and should be taken into account when measuring the benefits of IPR. And if
56. According to data from Lex Machina, 1,723 petitions for IPR were filed in 2017, and
1,6o8 were filed in 2018. Not all of these petitions were directed at distinct patents. See David P.
Ruschke & William V. Saindon, PowerPoint Presentation at Chat with the Chief: An Analysis of
Multiple Petitions in ALA Trials, at slide 5 (Oct. 24, 2017), available at https://www.uspto.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/Chat with theChiefBoardsideChatMultiplePetitionStudy
20171024 .pdf (reporting that the 7,168 PTAB petitions filed throughJune 2017 involved 4,376
distinct patents). But even if we counterfactually assume that each petition was directed at a
distinct patent, 1,700 challenged patents a year would pale in comparison to the rate of new
patent issuance. In 2015 alone, the PTO granted nearly 300,000 patents. See U.S. PATENT
STATISTICS CHART CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2015, USPTO (June 15, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/usstathtm.
57. See 35 U.S.C. § 314. Though the statute gives the PTO Director the authority to institute
IPR, that authority has been delegated to the PTAB. See37 C.F.R. § 42.1o8 (2012).
58. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
59. See Dennis Crouch, How Many US Patents are In-Force?, PATENTLY-O (May 4, 2012),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/05 /how-many-us-patents-are-in-force.html (estimating, in
2012, that 2.1 million U.S. patents were currently in force).
6o. Furthermore, certain kinds of prior art are categorically excluded from consideration
in IPR. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (defining categories of invalidating prior art), with 35 U.S.C.
§ 3 11(b) (establishing scope of IPR proceedings). This only reinforces the potential fallacy of
attempting to make inferences about patent quality from IPR invalidation data. By dint of 35
U.S.C. § 3 11(b), o% of IPR invalidations involve prior uses or sales; this obviously does not imply
that no patents are ever invalid as a result of prior uses or sales.
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As shown in Table i, excluding district court invalidations relying on
activity prior art does increase the percentage of invalidations rooted in
obviousness, but it does not eliminate the gap between district court patent
litigation and IPR. Once invalidity based on activity is excluded, obviousness
comprises 6o% of district court invalidity events. Even accounting for this
difference in prior art rules, obviousness remains significantly more common
in IPR.
Beyond this obvious but inadequate explanation, any number of theories
are conceivable.64 The cause of the discrepancy could plausibly turn on IPR
institution rates, the likelihood of success on the merits, incentives to settle
(or not) at any point in the IPR process, incentives to settle (or not) at various
stages of district court litigation, and the standards of proof that apply in each
process. The data do not permit us to accept or reject any hypotheses along
these lines.
For purposes of assessing the benefits of IPR, however, the cause of IPR's
frequent reliance on obviousness is irrelevant. Instead, it is the fact of it that
matters. While obviousness invalidations can certainly benefit the public, their
error correction value is often harder to discern, at least compared to
anticipation. A claim can be invalidated for anticipation only if that exact
invention already existed in a qualifying prior art reference.65 Because of this
requirement of equivalence, anticipation often constitutes a direct
vindication of the public domain-a direct rebuke of an inventor who sought
to claim what had already been disclosed to the public.66
Obviousness can serve a similar function, but the path is more
complicated. Typically, a finding of obviousness suggests that the exact
invention could not be found in a single prior art reference-otherwise, the
64. Several other straightforward explanations also fail to explain this result. For example,
some readers might wonder if the high percentage of obviousness invalidations is simply a result
of our decision to code each prior art combination as a distinct invalidation event. See supra notes
51-52 and accompanying text If obviousness lends itself to more distinct prior art combinations,
then it may appear more common in our dataset than it really is in practice. But we can test this
theory by dropping invalidations that cite different prior references but are otherwise redundant
(same IPR, patent, claim, and legal basis), and the numbers do not change very much: Still 8o%
of the remaining invalidations are rooted in obviousness, while only 20% are rooted in
anticipation. Another possible explanation is that perhaps PTAB tends to "backstop" anticipation
findings by also holding the same claim to be obvious-for example, to make it more likely that
one finding or the other will survive appeal. If every anticipated claim is automatically held to be
obvious, but not every obvious claim is necessarily anticipated, we would expect to see obviousness
findings overrepresented in the data. But this explanation also fails to survive scrutiny. If we
further drop all obviousness invalidations that are redundant with an anticipation invalidation
(same IPR, patent, and claim), and treat these as only anticipation events, we still find a significant
imbalance: 78% of IPR invalidations were based on obviousness, with only 22% based on
anticipation. Therefore, our decision to code redundant claim invalidations accounts for a very
small amount of the imbalance between anticipation and obviousness.
65. See Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
66. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1998).
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fact-finder could have simply relied on anticipation. The error correction
story for obviousness relies on faulting the inventor for seeking to patent
something that was new, but that was insufficiently inventive in light of one or
more qualifying prior art references.
Moreover, the vast majority of obviousness invalidations in IPR relied on
this doctrinal freedom to cite multiple references:
Chart 1. Number of References Cited (§ 103)
1 2 3 4 5+
Chart i illustrates the percentage of IPR obviousness invalidations relying
on a specified number of references. As Chart i shows, 85% of these
invalidations relied on two or more prior art references to establish the prima
facie case of obviousness. The average number of references cited was 2.3; the
most cited was 7.0.
To be clear, revoking an obvious patent can certainly benefit the public.
But when it comes to incentivizing inventors to change their conduct, it is
debatable whether cancelling a patent because it would have been obvious to
combine multiple references enforces a mutually exclusive choice.67 And the
vast majority of IPR claim cancellations appear to fall into that category.
B. CATEGORIES OFPPIORART
At the highest level, we classified invalidating prior art using four
categories: U.S. patents (including U.S. patent applications), foreign patents
(including applications to foreign patent offices and applications filed under
67. SeeYelderman, supra note 12, at 1258-62 (discussing conflicting views as to whether the
decision to invent something obvious is a mutually exclusive choice).
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the Patent Cooperation Treaty), printed publications, and admissions.68 Chart
2 illustrates the percentage of claim-level invalidity events relying on each
category of prior art:
Chart 2. Basis for Invalidity
mAnticipation 9obvlousness (any) Eobvlousness (all)
US PATENT FOREIGN PATENT PRINTED ADMISSIONS
PUBLICATION
The prior art for anticipation events is straightforward to interpret.
Represented by the solid black columns, the majority of anticipation
invalidations (64%) relied on U.S. patents and patent applications. Printed
publications constituted a distant second, providing support for 26% of claim-
level anticipation events. Reliance on foreign patents was quite rare,
constituting just i o% of observed anticipation events. There were no cases in
which PTAB found a claim anticipated by the applicant's own admissions.
These non-U.S. patent categories are particularly insignificant when one
considers how infrequently IPRs invoked anticipation in the first place. As a
percentage of all invalidity events, anticipation by printed publications and
foreign patents constitutedjust 4.4% and 1.6%, respectively.
The prior art relied upon for obviousness invalidations is more
complicated, since PTAB typically relied on more than one reference to
support that conclusion. For this reason, the prior art behind obviousness
invalidations is presented in two ways. First, the hashed columns indicate the
percentage of obviousness events that drew on any references in that category.
Second, the gray columns indicate the percentage of obviousness events that
drew entirely on references in that category.69
68. Admissions include statements made in the patent application itself or during
prosecution regarding the state of the prior art.
69. The numbers atop the hashed and gray columns do not sum to i because of obviousness
invalidations citing multiple references.
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Comparing the hashed columns to the gray columns reveals the
prevalence of cross-category combinations. For example, over three quarters
of obviousness invalidations (76%) cited at least one U.S. patent. But only
41% of obviousness invalidations drew only on U.S. patents. Likewise, almost
half of obviousness invalidations (47%) cited a printed publication, but only
15% of obviousness invalidations relied exclusively on printed publications.
The final two categories-foreign patents and admissions-appear to
largely play a supporting role in obviousness. Only 5% of obviousness
invalidations relied exclusively on foreign patents, and there were no
obviousness invalidations relying exclusively on admissions. However, art in
these categories was cited as part of the prima facie case of obviousness with
some regularity-21 % of obviousness invalidations cited a foreign patent, and
7% of obviousness invalidations cited an applicant admission.
The following Sections will explore each of these categories in greater
detail, beginning with printed publications.
C. PRINTED PUBLICATIONS
The incentivizing power of revoking a patent can vary significantly within
these top-level categories. The printed publication category is perhaps the
best example of this. At one extreme, an invalidation based on a printed
publication can punish a fraudster who sought to claim an invention that was
already widely known throughout an industry. Alternatively, a very similar
invalidation could involve a piece of prior art which was not widely known,
but that a reasonably diligent search would have revealed. Or, to go to the
opposite extreme, an invalidation based on a printed publication could be a
case of tough luck, where the inventor did everything right, but nonetheless
was ensnared by an obscure publication neither she nor any of her peers had
ever seen.70
The incentivizing value of invalidating patents based on printed
publications varies to these extremes in part because the Federal Circuit has
interpreted the category so expansively.7, A publicly accessible document
found anywhere in the world may qualify as prior art, even if it would have
been extremely difficult to find at the time of invention.7 Indeed, under the
Federal Circuit's Klopfenstein test, printed publication can include things that
colloquially would not be understood as "publications" at all-such as slide
shows, poster boards, and handouts displayed or distributed at conferences.73
70. SeeYelderman, supra note 12, at 1272-76.
71. Seeln reKlopfenstein, 380 F-3d 1345, 1350-52 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
72. Id. at 1350.
73. Id. at 13 5 0- 5 2.
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This approach has been criticized,74 though its effects have not been
previously quantified.
To determine whether the printed publications used in IPR typically fit
the colloquial understanding of that term or exploit the fringes of Klopfenstein,
we classified publications into a number of sub-categories. Chart 3 illustrates
the percentage of claim-level anticipation and obviousness events relying on
each sub-category of printed publications:
Chart 3. Basis for Invalidity-Printed Publications
WAnticipation 130bviousness (any)
REGULARLY CATALOG/ OTHER CONFERENCE
PUBLISHEDBOOK/ MANUAL/
JOURNAL BROCHURE
The first category shown in Chart 3 is "regularly published books and
journals." These are traditional reference publications-the kind a library
might collect and an interested researcher might access.75 As Chart 3 shows,
this category of publication was cited with some frequency. As a percentage of
anticipation invalidations citing a printed publication, regularly published
books and journals were cited about 33% of the time. Among obviousness
invalidations citing a printed publication, at least one publication in this
category was cited 75% of the time.
This leaves a long tail of invalidations based on publications that are not
regularly published books and journals. The smallest of these was the
"catalogs, manuals, and brochures" category-documents distributed to teach
the public about the features or availability of a product. Though cited
74. See, e.g., Margo A. Bagley, Academic Discourse and Proprietary Rights: Putting Patents in Their
Proper Place, 47 B.C. L. REv. 217, 221 (2006).
75. For purposes of classification, a book was in this category if its citation included the name
of a publisher (distinct from the author) and a year of publication. A journal was in this category
if its citation referred to a multi-volume periodical and a year of publication. This category also
includes publicly available documentation describing industry or government standards.
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infrequently (just 2% of an already small share of anticipation events citing a
printed publication, and 7% of obviousness events citing at least one printed
publication), these were conceptually interesting cases because they illustrate
how the Federal Circuit's broad interpretation of "printed publication" can
be used to expand the statutory scope of IPR. Under Klopfenstein, documents
like these may qualify under the "publication" gate. But in practice, catalogs,
manuals, and brochures are often evidence of prior uses and sales-a distinct
category of prior art that Congress sought to exclude from IPR.76 Publications
in this category thus blur the line between the domain of IPR and the domain
of other procedural tools for challenging validity.77
The final two sub-categories hown in Chart 3 are even more obscure. We
classified a publication as a "conference proceeding" if it was presented or
distributed at an academic or industry conference, and did not otherwise
meet the definition of a regularly published book or journal. Finally, we
included a catch-all category, "other," for publications not falling into any of
the aforementioned categories.
Documents in these latter three categories would often fail the colloquial
understanding of "printed publication," but nonetheless qualify under
Klopfenstein's interpretation of that term. To provide just a few examples, we
observed publications consisting of product instructional videos, public
requests for comments, proposals to standards bodies, early Internet posts,
doctoral dissertations, industry white papers, and transcripts of regulatory
briefings. The accessibility of these documents varies somewhat (and, in some
cases, might be debatable), but all of them legally qualified as prior art without
meeting our definition of a regularly published book orjournal.
As Chart 3 shows, a substantial minority of obviousness invalidations
relied on a printed publication in one or more of these non-traditional
categories. Among obviousness invalidations citing a publication, about 37%
relied on at least one publication that was not a regularly published book or
journal.8 (For purposes of anticipation, the percentage of non-traditional
publication was even higher-67%-but cases of anticipation based on
printed publications were rare to begin with.)79 From the perspective of IPR
76. See 3 5 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
77. For example, the same act of Congress that created IPR also created a similar challenge
mechanism called post-grant review, or "PGR." PGR operates much like IPR, but it permits
challenges based on any kind of prior art and any patentability requirement. See 35 U.S.C. § 3 21(b).
The catch is that the window for PGR is time-limited-a petition may only be filed in the first nine
months after a patent issues. 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). Liberally permitting evidence of prior uses and
sales to be cited in IPR as "printed publications" therefore risks thwarting the statutory design.
78. This number is less than the sum of the relevant hashed columns in Chart 3 (which sum
to 46%) because some obviousness invalidations draw on non-traditional art in multiple categories.
79. Recall that anticipation based on printed publications constitutes only 4.4% of all IPR
invalidation events. See supra Section IV.B.
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invalidity overall, about 17% of invalidations cited at least one non-traditional
publication.so
IPR's routine reliance on this obscure category of prior art does not bode
well for its ability to incentivize future inventors. In many cases, it would have
been impractical (if not impossible) for the inventor to find the publication
that would have rendered her invention obvious. For example, if it so happens
that the inventor missed out on the conference or industry roundtable where
the relevant publication was distributed or discussed, there may have been no
realistic way for her to discover it after the fact. Likewise, even if a catalog or
brochure was distributed widely when it was first produced, it may not have
been amenable to search at the relevant time of invention. These do not
appear to be inventor-incentivizing error corrections.
D. U.S. PATENTS AS PRIOR ART
The next category of prior art is U.S. patents-including both granted
patents and published applications. Because of the highly structured and
centralized nature of these documents, we have the richest data on them of
all the prior art categories. For example, we know precisely what was filed,
when, by whom, and when that information actually became visible to the
public. There are also a few special legal rules about how U.S. patents are
treated as prior art, so a bit of background will be helpful here.
It might seem that, as a category, U.S. patents and patent applications
would be the easiest form of prior art for a prospective inventor to discover.
Granted patents and published applications are stored in a single, centralized
repository.8' They are written in English. They are text-searchable in a number
of free, publicly accessible databases, including the PTO's own website.82 And
each patent and application has been assigned a field classification, allowing
a searcher to quickly narrow her inquiry to the documents most likely to be
relevant.83 All of this would suggest that invalidations based on U.S. patent
8o. If one takes the error-correction value of IPR as a given, it is possible to see a silver lining
in these cancellations based on non-traditional publications. Because these publications are not
usually searchable, they are the kind of prior art that only an adversarial challenge procedure
would be likely to uncover.
81. The PTO began publishing certain patent applications in the year 2000. See American
Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 1o6-113, 113 Stat. 1501, 150A-561 (1999)
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 122).
82. See, e.g., Search for Patents, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/
search-patents (last visited June 8, 2019); GOOGLE PATENTS, https://patents.google.com (last
visited Apr. 18, 2019).
83. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § go2.ol (a), USPTO [hereinafter MPEP],
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s9o2.html (last visitedJune 8, 2019).
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prior art will reliably constitute a valuable and highly incentivizing form of
error correction84
But there is a catch. Under certain conditions, U.S. patents and patent
applications can actually be impossible for a rival inventor to find at the time
she prepares her own application. The reason has to do with special prior art
timing rules that apply only to U.S. patents and patent applications. The
timing rule that applies to all other categories of prior art is straightforward:
A disclosure becomes legally effective as prior art on the day that information
became available to the public.85 But a different timing rule applies to U.S.
patents and patent applications. Their disclosure qualifies as prior art on the
day the underlying application was filed, provided that the application is later
published or results in a granted U.S. patent.86
What makes this tricky is that applications are legally protected as secret
when they first arrive at the PTO.7 They persist in this secret form until one
of two things happens: (1) they are published (which typically occurs 18
months after filing, though an applicant can opt-out out of this procedure);88
or (2) they result in a granted patent (typically several years after filing).89
Until one of those two triggering events occurs, pending applications are not
prior art. But the moment one of those things does occur, the application
springs back in time, and becomes retroactively effective as prior art. No other
category of prior art is treated this way.90
Because of this springing rule, U.S. patents and patent applications can
be either the most obscure form of prior art or the most accessible. The
difference comes down to timing. If the prior art patent was published or
granted at the time the focal patent' was filed, it is certainly the kind of thing
a reasonable art search should have uncovered. But if it was not yet granted
84. If one reason for revoking patents is to encourage reasonably diligent art searches
before inventing or filing a patent, that reasonably diligent search surely includes a trip to the
PTO's own patent database. SeeYelderman, supra note 12, at 1274; see also MERGES & DUFFY, supra
note 36, at 398-402.
85. See 35 U.S.C. § 1o2(a). Patents also formally qualify for this timing treatment, though
the preferential rules discussed momentarily will render this path superfluous in many situations.
There are, naturally, a few complications. For example, an offer for sale can qualify as prior art
as soon as the invention is "ready for patenting"--even if the offer itself does not disclose any
specific information about the invention. SeePfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 66-67 (1998).
86. See 35 U.S.C. § io2(e) (2oo6).
87. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2012).
88. Id.
89. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, FY 2018 PERFORMANCE AND AccouNTABILrIY
REPORT 57 (2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/USPTOFYi8PARpdf
(reporting average total pendency for patent applications).
go. For an argument that printed publications ought to receive the same treatment, see Sean
B. Seymore, When Patents Claim Preexisting Knowledge 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1965, 1979 (2017).
91. The term "focal patent" refers to the patent that is the subject of the validity inquiry. In
contrast, "cited patent" refers to the one that threatens to invalidate the focal patent.
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or published, the prospective inventor would have had no way of discovering
it, no matter how much she may invest in search.92
To determine the frequency with which IPR invalidations rely on these
rules, we supplemented our IPR dataset with various PTO datasets providing
application filing, publication, and grant dates for all focal and cited patents.
By comparing these dates, we were able to identify invalidity events for which
the springing mechanism was necessary or potentially necessary for the cited
patent to qualify as prior art:
Chart 4. U.S. Patent Prior Art
m Anticipation IB Obviousness (any)
SPRINGING RULE RELIED SPRINGING RULE RELIED NO RELIANCE ON
UPON UPON OR POTENTIALLY SPRINGING RULE
RELIED UPON
As Chart 4 illustrates, the springing mechanism of U.S. patents appears
central to their use as prior art in IPR. Roughly 35% of the time a U.S. patent
was the basis for invalidating the focal patent, it unambiguously could not
have qualified as prior art without reliance on the springing rule.93 Moreover,
there were a significant number of ambiguous cases, in which the springing
92. This springing mechanism can even stymie patent examiners-though they have access
to pending applications, they are not permitted to cite them until they become public. It is thus
possible for a patent to be valid the day it is granted, but later become invalid as a result of
subsequent events in the life of a different pending application. In practice, however, this very
rarely explains why PTAB reached a different conclusion about validity than the line examiner.
Among all IPR invalidations relying on U.S. patents, the prior art had become public by the time
the focal patent issued in 98% of cases.
93. To qualify for the "certain reliance" category, the prior art patent could not have
published or issued until a date after the focal patent's priority date. For purpose of determining
the priority dates of focal patents, we considered only the most reliable forms of priority claims
-continuations, divisionals, reissues, and national entry from a Patent Cooperation Treaty
application. We excluded priority claims that are more vulnerable to attack in litigation, such as
foreign priority claims, provisionals, and continuations-in-part. This will tend to understate the
number of cases in which the springing rules were necessary to qualify the patent as prior art.
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prior art rules may or may not have played a role in qualifying the cited patent
as prior art.94 The springing prior rule was unambiguously unnecessary in o ly
about half of invalidations based on U.S. patents.95
The extent of IPR's reliance on the springing prior art rules only
becomes greater when one remembers how frequently U.S. patents were cited
in general-64% of anticipation events were based on U.S. patent prior art,
and 76% of obviousness invalidations cited at least one U.S. patent as a
reference.96 In sum, between 26% and 38% of all IPR invalidations cited at
least one patent or patent application that could not qualify as prior art
without the benefit of the springing prior art rules.
These do not appear to be inventor-incentivizing error corrections. In
cases like these, there was no lawful way for the inventor to discover the fatal
prior art reference, no matter how hard she might have searched. While these
invalidations might serve some other purpose, creating future incentives for
inventors to break into the PTO to read secret applications isn't one of them.
E. FOREGN PATENTS
Our final category is foreign patents. Though io% of anticipation events
cited a foreign patent, these accounted for an extremely small share-less
than 2%-of IPR invalidity overall. Roughly 2 1% of obviousness invalidations
cited a foreign patent, while about 5% of obviousness invalidations relied
exclusively on foreign patents.
It is difficult to generalize about the obscurity of foreign patents. On one
hand, they can be found in centralized repositories. On the other hand, the
94. The reason we could not always conclusively determine whether there was reliance on
the springing prior art rule is that, in some scenarios, qualification as prior art would have
depended on the focal patent's date of invention, which is distinct from its filing date. For
example, if the cited patent granted or published less than a year before the focal patent was
filed, its status as prior art (in a world without springing rules) would turn on when the invention
of the focal patent was actually invented. Date of invention is a complex question for litigation,
and one which the springing rule itself may have avoided the need to litigate. In these ambiguous
cases, the springing mechanism made it easier to qualify the prior art, but we cannot say whether
or not the same art would have qualified absent a springing mechanism.
95. To qualify for the "no reliance" category, the prior art needed to be published or issued
more than one year prior to the focal patent's earliest domestic priority claim. In these cases, the
challenger could rely on § 102(b), making the springing mechanism irrelevant. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (2oo6).
We should emphasize that we have been extremely conservative in drawing the line
between cases in which the springing rules certainly or possibly played a role in qualifying the
patent as prior art. For example, a large number of anticipating patents would have moved into
the "certain" column if we had assumed that the focal patent was entitled to the benefit of its
provisional filing date. In these cases, the springing prior art rules made the provisional filing
irrelevant. However, in a hypothetical world without the springing prior art rules, the focal
patent's priority claim to that provisional might have failed, providing an alternative path for the
art to qualify.
96. See supra Section IV.B.
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ease of searching foreign patents can vary greatly depending on the country.
In the majority of foreign patent offices, the proceedings are conducted in a
language other than English. And, of course, there are a lot of patent offices
-well over a hundred-spread all around the world.
The encouraging news here is that IPR's reliance on foreign patents
appears limited to a tightly circumscribed group of patent offices. By
searching in just four places-the Japan Patent Office, the European Patent
Office, the Intellectual Property Office of the United Kingdom, and the World
Intellectual Property Organization-one could uncover 96% of the foreign
patents cited in IPR for purposes of anticipation and 98% of the foreign
patents cited in IPR for purposes of obviousness. Moreover, the inventor
cannot blame a springing prior art rule in these cases.97 These are prior art
references that a reasonably diligent search ought to have found.
Putting all of this together, non-incentivizing error correction appears to
constitute a substantial share of the work of IPR. Non-traditional publications
and secret pending patent applications were the basis for somewhere between
42% and 53% of all IPR invalidations during the study period. These are cases
in which an inventor lost her claim on account of prior art would have been
difficult or impossible for her to find at the time of her invention. Indeed,
around 2 1 % of IPR obviousness invalidations appeared to rely on multiple
obscure prior art references-essentially a conclusion that it would have been
obvious for one of ordinary skill to combine one secret thing with another
secret thing to arrive at the claimed invention.
To be clear, this is not to say that these cancellations lack value-we are
exploring only one specific theory of how IPR might benefit the public. Still,
on this front, the news is discouraging: The inventor-incentivizing benefit
appears to be lacking in roughly half of all IPR cancellations.
V. IPR's RELATIONSHIP TO EXAMINATION
This data can shed light on another set of questions as well, having to do
with the relationship between IPR and the initial round of examination
performed by the PTO. As the Supreme Court has observed, the purpose of
97. As always, there are complications. Technically, a subset of Patent Cooperation Treaty
applications designating the United States are also eligible for springing treatment under 35 U.S.
§ 102(e). See MPEP § 7o6.o2(f)(1)(I)(C), USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/
pac/mpep/s7o6.html (last visited June 8, 2og) (explaining application of these rules). In
practice, however, we found no cases of certain reliance on the springing prior art rules for
foreign patents in this category, and only a small number of cases of potential reliance.
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IPR is that it gives the PTO a chance to take a "second look"98 at its own work,
"to reconsider and cancel patent claims" that it should not have issued in the
first place.99 The prior art underlying IPR cancellation reveals something
about the nature of this "second look."
In all of the invalidations in our dataset, the adversarial scrutiny of IPR
led the PTAB to determine that the line examiner's initial decision to grant a
claim had been in error. Though not necessarily the whole story,- the prior
art supporting the ultimate conclusion of invalidity can shed some light on
why the PTO might have reached a different decision upon reconsideration.
For example, suppose that a claim is invalidated in IPR based entirely on prior
art that was part of the examination record. In that case, the disagreement
between the line examiner and PTAB is one of interpretation-the initial
examiner failed'ol to properly construe the claim, understand the prior art,
correctlyjudge the novelty or nonobviousness of the claim in light of that art,
or some combination of the above. By contrast, if a claim is invalidated in IPR
on the basis of prior art that wasn't known during examination, the
disagreement may be rooted in something more fundamental. When new art
is introduced in IPR, PTAB and the line examiner were drawing on different
factual records. In a sense, they were simply answering different questions.
Moreover, the nature of the new art cited in IPR could also shed light on
the procedure's effectiveness as a supplemental form of patent examination.
One of the reasons for offering an adversarial challenge procedure is that it
may bring in prior art that would otherwise be unavailable to line examiners.
As a practical matter, government employees sitting in Alexandria, Virginia,
may have no way of accessing certain kinds of prior art. In theory, a third-party
challenge mechanism like IPR creates a vehicle for the PTO to consider prior
98. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1374
(2018) (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 1 36 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)).
99. Id. at 1370.
1oo. For example, some of the claims invalidated as obvious in IPR may have been examined
under a different legal standard. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2008)
(rejecting Federal Circuit's prior "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" test). As another example,
in some future cases, the disagreement between the examiner and PTAB could be explained by
differences in how claims are supposed to be interpreted during examination as opposed to IPR.
See Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,340, 51,342 (Oct. 11, 2018) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. Pt. 42). But this distinction cannot be blamed for any of the disagreement
we observed, as PTAB applied the same "broadest reasonable construction" standard in IPR
throughout the study period. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. at 2142.
ios. Of course, to say that the examiner "failed" is to take a side in this intra-agency
disagreement-that is, it presumes that PTAB was right and the line examiner was wrong. While
this may not always be true as an epistemological matter, it holds as a legal proposition. Subject
only to deferential review by the Federal Circuit, PTAB's conclusion of invalidity will be treated
as correct notwithstanding the line examiner's conclusion to the contrary. See Merck & Cie v.
Gnosis S.PA., 8o8 F. 3d 829, 840-81 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Federal Circuit's "highly deferential" standard of review).
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art that examiners may be unable to find on their own. The art cited in FWDs
reveals whether or not IPR is actually delivering this potential benefit.
We start by noting that the initial stages of IPR proceedings may create a
bias in favor of challenges based on new art and away from challenges based
on art that was part of the examination record. If patent challengers perceive
(rightly or wrongly) that PTAB is less likely to institute an IPR based on art
already known to examiners, they may shy away from mounting such
challenges-perhaps even stretching to bring challenges on prior art that is
objectively weaker but happens to look new. Moreover, if PTAB is actually less
likely to institute an IPR based on art that was known during examination,
that too will have an effect on the kinds of challenges than end up producing
FWDs. Given these strategic considerations and selection effects, one might
expect very few invalidations to be based entirely on prior art that was known
during examination.
And yet, such cases do exist. Indeed, our data shows that 21% of all
anticipation events were based on prior art that was already part of the original
examination record. In cases of obviousness, 8% were rooted entirely on
references that were already known.102 In the majority of cases, however, PTAB
relied on multiple, previously uncited references:
Chart 5. Obviousness and Uncited Art
U # of uncited references serving as basis for obviousness
0 1 2 3 4+
Chart 5 tabulates all claim-level obviousness events based on the number
of references cited in IPR that were uncited in examination. For example, the
102. One might suspect that these cancellations were largely directed at patents examined
before the Supreme Court revisited the obviousness standard in KSR That suspicion would be
wrong. Essentially all (98%) of the claims found obvious in light of art known during examination
had been examined after KSR was handed down.
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first column-o uncited references-corresponds to the 8% of obviousness
events in which PTAB relied exclusively on prior art known to the PTO during
examination. By contrast, 35% of obviousness events relied on a single
reference unknown to the PTO, and 57% involved two or more such
references.
Counting cases of either anticipation or obviousness, 89% of IPR
invalidations relied on one or more references that were missing from the
examination record. The majority of this previously unknown prior art was at
least potentially discoverable through a traditional prior art search. For
example, combining only U.S. patents and patent applications with the prior
art already part of the examination record would yield the prior art necessary
to sustain 51 % of all IPR invalidations. Adding regularly published books and
journals would yield the prior art necessary to sustain another 23%.
By contrast, previously unknown foreign patents and non-traditional
printed publications were rarely the basis for cancellation in IPR. About 16%
of our observed invalidations relied on a previously uncited foreign patent;
only 12% relied on a previously uncited non-traditional publication. (These
numbers sum to slightly more than i oo% because of a small number of cases
involving uncited references in multiple categories.)
To be clear, none of this data should be used to fault line examiners, or
otherwise make inferences about patent quality in general. The fact that the
majority of IPR invalidations drew exclusively on U.S. patents, applications,
and art already in the record does not tell us anything about the examiner
error rate in applying art in those categories. It can, however, shed light on
how IPR is functioning in practice, and whether a different tool might be able
to provide similar error correction at lower cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the years since its introduction, IPR has quickly become a popular
mechanism for adjudicating patent validity. While this procedural tool may
have a number of subtle effects on district court litigation and other aspects
of the patent system, its most immediate impact has been to substantially
increase the number of patents subjected to adversarial scrutiny.
Whether the benefits of this increased scrutiny justify its substantial cost
is another question. The direct costs, at least, are straightforward to quantify
-publicly available data indicates how many cases are brought to each stage
every year, and at approximately what cost. The benefits, however, are harder
to specify. While commentators have noted a number of potential benefits a
procedural tool like this might deliver, the process of assessing whether IPR is
indeed delivering those benefits has only begun.
This Essay explored one particular theory of how IPR might benefit the
public-that revoking invalid patents will sharpen inventors' incentives to
comply with the demands of patent law in the future. Unfortunately, this
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potential benefit appears to be lacking in a substantial number of recent IPRs.
Approximately half of the cancellations we observed in a one-year study
period relied on prior art which would have been difficult or impossible for
the inventor to discover at the time of the invention. To be clear, this is not to
say they lack any public benefit. Rather, future study will be necessary to
explore other theories of how invalidation can serve the public interest and
whether these benefits obtain in IPR.
